









We analyze whether investment in the education of both women and men serves to empower 
wives resulting in more balanced household decisions being taken on matters related to 
consumption and financial management. We consider that household decision-making can be 
made by mainly the wife, mainly the husband or the couple acting jointly. We then apply 
multinomial probit models to the Spanish Living Conditions Survey of 2010. Results show 
that, when controlling for demographic, family and labor market characteristics, the level of 
education of both the husband and wife has a positive effect in terms of a more egalitarian 
decision-making process in relation to three areas of expenditure: daily shopping, expensive 
purchases of consumer durables, and significant expenditure on children. However, only 
women’s education has a positive effect on borrowing money and no effect of education is 
observed with regard to the use of savings. Results are less conclusive for households where 
decisions are taken primarily by the wife or husband, since men’s education increases the role 
of husbands in the household making-decision process whereas no effect of wives’ education 
is observed. 
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Important economic decisions are often made by households rather than by individuals. Just 
who is in charge of such major household decisions was the object of a pioneering analysis 
by Blood and Wolfe (1960). There are several models of household behavior that explain the 
decisions taken by its members. The traditional neoclassical model, known as the ‘unitary’ 
model, which is based on the existence of an altruistic husband, assumes that households 
behave as if they were a single entity with a common utility function and income pooling 
(Becker, 1991). An alternative or ‘collective’ model, however, considers that household 
members have different preferences and, as a result, household behavior is determined in a 
bargaining process that leads to an efficient use of the available resources (Vermeulen, 2002; 
Browning et al., 2006; Himmelweit et al., 2013). Also, several models have sought to relate 
this bargaining power with access to economic resources outside the household (Usdansky 
and Parker, 2011). 
 
Although collective models allow for the participation of both spouses in the decision-making 
process within households, women are traditionally less involved at all levels (Jan and 
Akhtar, 2008), even allowing for the dramatic changes in family and social relationships in 
the second half of the 20th century characterized by a trend towards greater equality in most 
dimensions of the roles of men and women (Thornton and Young-DeMarco, 2001). In this 
context, it seems pertinent to analyze the role of education in household decision-making. It 
is relevant to determine whether education serves to empower women in their marital 

































































negotiations and, thus, to achieve a more balanced decision-making process in relation to 
household economic activities. We do not consider the role of other family members, such as 
children, who can be involved in the household decision-making process (see Wut and Chou, 
2013).  
 
This impact of education falls within the analytical framework of Human Capital Theory,  
typically referred to as the ‘non-monetary benefits of education’, which include, among 
others, the positive effects of education on health, fertility or family structure (see Vila (2000) 
and Wolfe and Haveman (2001) as well as Escardíbul (2005) for Spain). Education is a key 
instrument in empowering women in the household because it helps them gain a better 
understanding of their rights and responsibilities, and it can raise their confidence with regard 
to their possibilities, especially in less developed countries (Acharya, 2008). Mederer (1993) 
shows that women with more resources demand a more equal division of labor and perceive 
anything less than that as unfair. Similarly, Usdansky and Parker (2011) show that married 
women in the US with a college degree express greater gender egalitarianism. 
 
This paper focuses on the impact of the education of both ge ders on a woman’s participation 
in specific aspects of household decision-making, such as consumption decisions (daily 
shopping, expensive purchases of consumer durables and significant expenditure on children) 
and borrowing and saving decisions. Thus, the purpose of the research is to analyze the role 
of education in the household decision-making process. Our study makes several 
contributions to the literature. First, rather than examining solely the effect of women’s 
education on their empowerment in the household decision-making process, we also consider 
the impact of men’s education. Second, to date, most studies conducted in this field have 
adopted a qualitative approach, but by undertaking a quantitative analysis we are able to 

































































include a large sample of households. Finally, this is the first empirical analysis to be carried 
out in Spain, a Mediterranean economy with strong cultural links to other Southern European 
countries. As such, this study should serve as a useful guide for the conducting of analyses in 
these similar countries. In comparison to Northern European countries, Southern European 
countries have a limited development of family policies, and public welfare policies are 
characterized by family solidarity and dependency still based on the existence of a male 
breadwinner, especially in Italy, Greece and Spain (Flaquer, 2002; Naldini, 2003; Moreno 
Mínguez, 2013). Likewise, Southern European countries are also more attached to traditional 
gender roles in the division of labor in the household (Hank and Jürges, 2007). We expect 
that in a country like Spain, where equality between men and women has advanced 
significantly since the advent of democracy (Zufiaurre et al., 2010), an increase in the 
educational level of the wife and/or husband is associated with a more egalitarian distribution 




In this section we examine studies that consider the role of education in household decision-
making. We focus on expenditure decisions but we also consider the division of household 
labor (a topic mainly analyzed in more developed countries). Most of the literature 
considering the impact of education on women’s autonomy focuses on developing countries 
and examines a range of different aspects related to the household. These studies show that 
women with a higher level of education make more household decisions regarding 
consumption and savings than those with lower levels. Likewise, the higher the education 
level of their husbands, the more egalitarian these household decisions tend to be.  
 

































































In Asia, Sai Sujatha and Brahmananda Reddy (2009) associated women’s education in 
Andhra Pradesh (India) with greater autonomy in their decision-making concerning major 
household purchases as well as those for daily household chores. Moreover, women’s access 
to money and their freedom to decide how to spend it (that is, having and using a bank or 
savings account) were also positively related to the level of education attained. Likewise, 
Chanda et al. (2012) concluded that in Bangladesh, women’s say in decisions regarding 
household purchases increased with education. In the case of Taiwan, Xu and Lai (2002) 
showed the positive effects of a wife’s education on the likelihood of her making decisions 
alone or jointly (with her husband) on consumption and estate purchases. Finally, in the 
framework of experiments examining theories of risky choice among households as opposed 
to individuals, Carlsson et al. (2013) analyzed household decision-making in a high-stakes 
experiment in China, whereby spouses had to choose between risky lotteries (first separately 
and then jointly). Their analysis showed that although a couple’s joint decision was typically 
similar to the husband’s, women with more education than their husbands had a stronger 
influence on the joint decision. 
 
In Latin America, Lawrence and Mancini (2008) found that increases in male education and 
female labor force participation (which is clearly related to women’s educational level) in 
Venezuela raised the probability that couples made decisions equally regarding consumption 
and savings, among other issues. In Mexico, Oropesa (1997) reported that educational 
attainment was a key variable for increasing the likelihood of wives having an equal say in 
decisions and their degree of satisfaction with their influence in household decisions.  
 
In the case of more developed countries, studies have tended to focus more closely on the 
role of education in the division of household labor (see Gupta, 2006; Ruppanner, 2010). One 

































































notable exception is the work of Treas and Tai (2012). With representative samples from 31 
countries (data were drawn from the 2002 International Social Survey Program) in Europe 
(including Spain), Latin America, Israel, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, 
and Russia, the authors focused on heterosexual couples (aged 18 to 65, married with 
children younger than 18 years in the household). They concluded that, in relation to major 
purchases, better educated wives were more likely to make decisions jointly with their 
husbands. 
 
These results are in line with Coltrane (2000), who reviewed more than 200 studies of 
household labor, and concluded that higher levels of education disposed individuals to a more 
equal allocation of household chores. In addition, Hank and Jürges (2007) showed that male 
and female education increased the egalitarian division of household labor across Europe. 
Nevertheless, Southern European countries have subscribed to more traditional gender roles 
in household management (Nordenmark, 2004; Hank and Jürges, 2007; Strickney and 
Konrad, 2007). Thus, although differences among countries still exist education helps to 
achieve higher egalitarian levels with regard to household labor.  
 
Finally, in her review of various studies, Pahl (2000) showed that the greater the proportion 
of household income provided by the wife, the more likely she is to control household 
finances and to have power in financial decision-making. Although Pahl did not specifically 
consider education, a positive effect of education can be assumed given its relationship with 
earnings. 
 
With regard to income, most studies suggest that women’s earnings do not bring an automatic 
increase in their bargaining power in the household, since gender ideologies may be more 

































































important than income in some cases (Tichenor, 1999; Grasmuck and Espinal, 2000; Zipp et 
al., 2004). Thus, it is not women’s income per se that is important but the extent to which 
higher levels of income allow women to see themselves differently (Bruce, 1989). In 
addition, the income provider may condition the type of spending of the household. Thus, 
Shelley et al. (1998), Pahl (2000), and Vogler et al. (2008) show that expenditures on child 
care or for the whole household increase with women’s incomes. For less developed 
countries, Anderson and Eswaran (2009) show that in Bangladesh earned income could be 
more important than unearned income in empowering women: it is not employment as such 
but employment outside their husbands' farms that contributes to women's autonomy. To sum 
up, education seems to have a greater effect on increasing the role of women in household 





Data and sample  
 
This study draws on the secondary module entitled “Ability to make decisions” of Spain’s 
Living Conditions Survey (LCS) for 2010. The LCS was conducted by the National Statistics 
Institute in collaboration with Eurostat within the broader framework of European Union 
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). The LCS is an annual survey with a 
sample size of about 16,000 households, distributed in 2,000 census sections. 
 
Questions regarding a couple’s decision-making on family issues were asked of each current 
household member aged 16 and over living with a partner. Data allow us to distinguish 

































































between married and not married couples. However, since most couples are married (more 
than 90% in cohorts before 1970 and 82% after 1970), in the analysis we do not make such a 
distinction. Hereinafter we refer to the individuals as husband and wife regardless of the legal 
status of their union. The survey also includes both heterosexual and homosexual couples. 
However, we did not have sufficient observations to analyze the decision-making in 
homosexual couples (0.6%), and so we only considered heterosexual unions.  
 
We matched each respondent with his or her partner for a total of 9,480 couples in the whole 
household survey; yet, the match was not complete, as less than 3 percent of individuals (both 
men and women) failed to respond to any of the questions that were relevant for this study. 
The statistical analysis was performed with a sample where full information was provided for 
all the variables used. No significant differences were observed between the descriptive 
statistics of the variables used in the regression analysis and those from the whole sample. 
Information is collected through in person interviews (and supplemented with phone 
interviews) with the members of each of the households under study. The time period of data 
collection is around three months during the first half of the year. Data are nationally 




We analyze the couples’ decision-making process in relation to five aspects of the household 
economy. The first three are consumption decisions: daily shopping, expensive purchases of 
consumer durables or furniture, and significant expenditure incurred in relation to children 
(up to 16 years old). Significant expenditure is self-defined by the person interviewed 
(although some hints may be provided to help the interviewees to answer). The last two are 

































































decisions related to borrowing and saving. All the questions enquiring about the decision-
making process in relation to these aspects of the household economy are phrased as follows: 
“The following questions about making certain decisions relate to you and your partner. Who 
makes decision about…?” The interviewees can respond in one of three ways: (a) More me 
(b) Balanced (c) More my partner. For each one of the five questions a different sample has 
been selected, including individuals who answered (a), (b) or (c) to each question and 
excluding individuals who answered another possible response such as (d) Neither of us has 
had to make such decisions or (e) We have no savings in common (for the question on 
savings). The question related to significant expenditure on children was asked only of 
respondents who had children up to 16 years old. On the basis of the responses to these 
questions we study couples’ decision-making in consumption as well as in borrowing and 
saving. We have five dependent variables, each of which comprises three discrete categories: 
(a) mainly the husband makes decisions, (b) mainly the wife makes decisions, and (c) the 
husband and wife make joint decisions.  
 
Table 1 shows the distribution of our five dependent variables. The percentages in the first 
column correspond to the pooled responses, whereas the percentages in the second and third 
columns correspond to the answers given by the male and female members of the couples, 
respectively. We find only minor differences between the distribution of male and female 
responses in each couple to questions regarding their decision-making (less than two 
percentage points). This suggests that in each couple the husband and wife are in substantial 
agreement with regards to how decisions about the household economy are made. For this 
reason, unlike Hank and Jürges (2007), this study does not undertake a separate analysis by 
gender. 
 

































































As shown in Table 1, the percentage of couples in which both members make joint decisions 
is lower for consumption issues than for borrowing and saving ones. This is particularly the 
case in daily shopping, where only 33% of respondents report making joint decisions, 
whereas 62% of respondents declare that mainly women decide. Thus, this task in Spain is 
predominantly decided by women as is commonly reported (see Bianchi et al., 2000, and 
Coltrane, 2000). The decisions on expensive purchases of consumer durables and significant 
expenditures on children are made primary by wives and husbands together (83% and 78% 
respectively). Men hardly make decisions alone in these issues (only 3% on major purchases 
and 1% on expenditure on children), whereas the percentages of decisions mainly taken by 
women are higher (14% and 20% respectively). A different pattern is observed in household 
decisions on loans and savings. Only 10% of these decisions are made by either wife or 
husband alone (being quite evenly distributed), whereas 90% of respondents report making 
joint decisions in these areas.  
 
(Insert Table 1 around here) 
 
With regards to independent variables, we consider both human capital and other control 
variables. Human capital is measured in terms of both the husband’s and wife’s educational 
attainment following the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-1997). 
Thus, we consider individuals with at least primary education, lower secondary education 
(compulsory education ends at the age of 16 in Spain), upper secondary education (academic 
or vocational), and tertiary education (which includes post-secondary education, mainly 
university studies).  
 

































































The control variables are related to the labor market, on the one hand, and demographic and 
family characteristics, on the other. Both types of variables are also related to power in 
decision-making (see Usdansky and Parker (2011) for the labor market and Hamel (1990) 
and Clark et al. (1991) for demographic and family characteristics). Labor market variables 
are whether the husband or wife has a paying job and, if so, their net monthly wage (the 
variable is coded 0 if individuals are not employed). Demographic and family characteristics 
are the following: the birth cohort of the husband and the wife, the country of birth (Spain or 
another country) of both members of the couple, whether they are living in a family with 
children under the age of 16, the population density of the household residence (high, 
medium, and low), and the region of residence (there are 17 regions in Spain and 2 
autonomous cities). For more details see the National Statistics Institute ECS, 2005 and the 
descriptive statistics for these independent variables in the Appendix (Table A). It should be 
noted that the birth cohort variable reflects cultural or sociopolitical factors linked to the 
generation of the people included in the analysis. Thus, the sociopolitical turning points in the 
modern history of Spain are considered through three birth cohorts: individuals who have 
lived their childhood under a dictatorship (before 1959, as reference category); in the 
transition to democracy period (the 1960s); and during the pre-democracy and democracy 
periods (the 1970s and after). The analysis is similar to that of Xu and Lai (2004) for Taiwan.  
 
The empirical strategy  
 
The empirical strategy adopted here comprises a multinomial probit regression of the 
probability that mainly the husband, mainly the wife or the two jointly make the economic 
decisions in their respective households. The baseline category in all estimations is that 
mainly the husband makes the economic decisions in the household, and this option is 

































































compared to mainly the wife making decisions and to both spouses making joint decisions. 
The reason why we opt to use the multinomial probit rather than the commonly used 
multinomial logit is that the latter requires the assumption of independence of irrelevant 
alternatives, whereas the multinomial probit relaxes that assumption. The assumption of 
independence of irrelevant alternatives means that when an individual faces a question in 
which they have to choose from the possible option, the probability that they choose one 
option is independent of the rest of alternatives (either if they are explicitly on the 
questionnaire or if they are not). In our analysis we cannot be sure that this assumption is 
validated since the number of existing options is relevant when someone is asked about how 
household decisions related to consumption or savings are taken. Thus, following Greene 
(2012), to be sure that our estimates are correct, we use a multinomial probit model that 
relaxes the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives. 
 
The advantage of the multinomial logit is that the coefficients can be directly interpreted as 
odds ratios (Long, 1997). Nevertheless, the calculation of marginal effects from the probit 
estimates is straightforward, and these are generally easier to interpret and understand than 
the odds ratios. The marginal effects from the probit estimates are calculated using the 
STATA 13 program, which provides robust estimators of the variance (Long & Freese, 2006; 
Solon et al., 2015).    
 
The structure of the multinomial probit equation is shown in (1), where j = 1, 2 and 3 refers to 
the different values of the dependent variable (the three possible outcomes for the economic 
decision). The term in the log-likelihood that corresponds to the choice of alternative q is 
shown in equation (2), and the probability for this occurrence in (3). The J-1 other choices are 
a cumulative probability from a (J-1)-multivariate normal distribution.  


































































],0[~],...,,[,,...,1,´ 21 Σ=+= NJjxU Jjjjj εεεεβ       (1) 
],,...,1,[Pr]Pr[ qjJjUUobchoice jqq ≠=>=       (2) 
])´(,...,)´(Pr[]Pr[ 1
1
βεεβεε JqqJqq xxwxqchoice −>−−>−=     (3) 
 
In the above expressions, X refers to the vector of explanatory variables, β is the vector of 
coefficients linked to the explanatory variables, and ε are the stochastic error terms, which are 
assumed to have independent, standard normal distributions. In the regression analysis data is 
not weighted since the Living Conditions Survey follows a complex sampling method, based 
on multistage and stratification, and no information about the weights for the strata is 
provided. In addition, we have tested the multicollinearity using the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) indicator as if our model was a lineal one. The VIF in all independent variables had a 
value between 1.2 and 6.7. Thus, being all values under 10, we did not have a problem of 




The two outcomes of the multinomial probit regression models are shown separately in 
Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 shows regression results of the probability that both wife and 
husband take part in household decisions instead of mainly the husband. Table 3 displays the 
results of the probability that mainly wives make decisions compared to mainly husbands 
deciding. We show the marginal effects of wife’s and husband’s education as well as the 
effect of income (men’s and women’s wages). All the estimations include the common set of 
control variables related to labor market, demographic and family characteristics. 


































































Results in Table 2 show that achieving higher levels of education by both wives and 
husbands increases the probability that household consumption decisions (such as daily and 
major household needs as well as decisions on significant expenditure on children) are made 
together. That is, education is statistically significant when tertiary education (and even upper 
secondary in some cases) is achieved. However, education hardly affects borrowing and 
saving decisions of the households: only wife’s education has a positive bearing on spouses 
deciding together with regards to loans, whereas no effect of education for either spouse is 
observed for savings. 
 
Thus, wife’s education fosters a more egalitarian decision-making process in all areas 
analyzed except savings, whereas husband’s education fosters it on all issues considered 
except loans and savings. Therefore, it seems that education of men and women, especially 
tertiary education, is relevant to fostering an egalitarian view in the household in 
consumption decisions. However, education seems less relevant in fostering egalitarianism 
with respect to loans and savings, especially in the case of husband’s education.  
 
Table 3 shows that higher levels of husband’s education (having achieved tertiary education 
and even upper secondary in most cases) reduces the probability that wives mainly decide 
compared to husbands mainly deciding. However, wife’s education hardly has an effect on 
these probabilities. Therefore, demographic and family characteristics being equal, if the 
husband is better educated then the wife is less likely to decide alone. 
 
(Insert Table 2 and 3 around here) 
 

































































With regards to income, as shown in Table 2, husband’s salary increases the probability that 
joint decisions are taken within the family compared to mainly the husband deciding (wife’s 
salary is hardly significant). Likewise, results in table 3 show that as the salary of the husband 
increases the likelihood that mainly the wife decides compared to mainly the husband 
deciding is reduced. In this analysis the wife’s salary is also hardly significant. The effects of 




We can conclude that increased educational attainment of both men and women serves to 
empower wives in terms of their making more joint decisions in at least three of the five areas 
of the household economy analyzed: daily shopping, expensive purchases of consumer 
durables and significant expenditure on children. In addition, women’s education also 
increases the probability of an egalitarian decision-making process in borrowing money. Our 
results are consistent with evidence from analyses of the non-monetary benefits of education 
as well as with the literature on the impact of improved education on egalitarianism (see 
Wolfe and Haveman, 2001; Usdansky and Parker, 2011). The positive effect of education on 
joint-decision in the household is a relevant issue for countries such as Spain, a Southern 
European country that has maintained more traditional gender roles in questions of household 
management (Nordenmark, 2004; Strickney and Konrad, 2007).  
 
However, results show the limited impact of education on fostering a joint decision process in 
economic issues within the household. On the one hand, education positively affects 
consumption decisions but hardly affects borrowing and saving decisions. On the other hand, 

































































the effect of education is basically confined to having attained higher education. Other levels 
such as upper secondary education are hardly significant.  
 
Results are less clear for households where mainly one of the spouses makes the decisions. In 
these cases, husband’s education reduces the probability of the wife deciding alone, whereas 
wife’s education has no effect. These results may mean that husband’s education reduces 
wife’s empowerment in the household decision-making process. However, from the 
perspective of the division of household labor (see Coltrane, 2000 and Hank and Jürges, 
2007), we also think that maybe these results show a reduction of housework for women, 
since their more educated husbands are taking decisions alone about daily shopping, 
expenditure on children or main household purchases, three activities in which men have 
been much less involved (see Table 1). This does not seem so clear in the case of borrowing 
and saving decisions, where decision-making is distributed more equally between men and 
women when they are the ones who mainly decide within the household. Thus, the results 
seem to show that education fosters a more equal distribution of household tasks related to 
consumption (where husbands are less involved). 
 
To sum up, our results suggest that gender equality policies need to take into consideration 
the role of education of both men and women in their attempts to foster egalitarianism since 
education increases joint decision-making in consumption decisions. In this case, education 
increases the probability that household decisions are made together by the couple or that 
husbands get involved when the decision is traditionally made by the wife. However, results 
are not so clear in borrowing and saving decisions.  
 

































































We believe that joint decision-making is a benefit for both couples and the society as a 
whole. Thus, our results may imply that the benefits of education are higher than those 
reported when only the economic returns of education are computed, since this type of non-
monetary benefit should also be taken into consideration.  
 
Nevertheless, education alone will not foster an egalitarian system of household decision-
making. Thus, other public policies are suggested, although more research is needed. Firstly, 
governments should implement family policies that may improve women’s participation in 
the labor market, as well as egalitarian policies to reduce the gap between men’s and 
women’s working conditions. Better working conditions for women may increase their power 
in the labor market and the society as a whole and, therefore, foster a more egalitarian joint 
decision process at home. The Spanish labor market has changed a lot in recent decades and 
is partially moving from a traditional male-breadwinner model to a dual-breadwinner one 
(Lewis, 2001; Dema-Moreno, 2009). Likewise, women’s rate of labor activity has increased 
significantly (from 27.1% in 1980 to 53.8% in 2015). However, there is still a high gender 
gap in wages (around 20%), unemployment (22.5% for women versus 19.5 for men) and 
part-time contracts (25.1% for women and 8.0% for men). Thus, Spain (as well as Italy and 
Greece) is below most countries of the European Union with regards to women’s labor 
market conditions (OECD, 2008; Guner et al., 2012; Wall and Escobedo, 2013; Guner et al., 
2014). 
 
Secondly, education policies aimed at modifying gender norms should be implemented. In 
primary and secondary schools, children should have the opportunity of discussing gender 
roles, whereas in tertiary education, courses dealing with subjects that examine gender and 
patriarchal relations should be introduced (Carrasco and Dominguez, 2011). In this sense, it 

































































has to be taken into consideration that consumption and borrowing and saving decisions that 
may seem to be as a result of negotiation between spouses are not always the case but rather 
tend to follow established customs (see Dema-Moreno, 2009 for a qualitative analysis for 
Spain). 
 
Our investigation does not provide an explicit analysis of the decision-making model itself. 
However, our results seem to be more consistent with a ‘collective’ model (described in the 
introduction) rather than with a ‘unitary’ model, since education encourages joint decision-
making. This is a characteristic of the ‘collective’ model, which considers that household 
members have different preferences and, therefore, household behavior is determined through 
a bargaining process. Thus, education of both men and women helps wives to actively 
participate in the household decision-making process on consumption. 
 
Our study has several limitations that should guide future research. Firstly, the quantitative 
analysis should be complemented with qualitative research that helps to understand the 
reasons behind the actions of husbands and wives with regards to household decision-
making. Secondly, other types of couples should be analyzed, such as homosexual couples as 
well as the different ways couples may live together (first marriage, second and other 
marriages, not married couples, etc.), since the development of different family models, 
especially in Western societies, questions the focus on traditional families only (see some 
examples in Domínguez-Folgueras, 2012; Goldberg et al., 2012; Schneider et al., 2013).   
 
However, we want to highlight the relevance of the analysis presented here for several 
reasons. Firstly, our study considers not only the effect of women’s education on their 
empowerment in the household decision-making process, but also the impact of men’s 

































































education. Our results show that both types of variables are relevant in order to explain the 
decision-making process within the household. Secondly, we show that the effect of 
education changes if the husband or the wife mainly takes the decision or whether they 
decide together is examined. Thirdly, our analysis considers a large number of households. 
Finally, our research is developed in a country where no previous evidence on the effect of 
education on household decision-making related to expenditure existed, and that may be 
useful for other analyses developed in the Mediterranean area. 
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Daily household needs    
Husband 5.25 5.84 4.66 
Wife 61.74 60.88 62.60 
Both 33.01 33.29 32.74 
Major household purchases     
Husband 2.67 2.77 2.56 
Wife 14.23 14.33 14.14 
Both 83.10 82.91 83.29 
Significant expenditure on children     
Husband 1.16 1.44 0.88 
Wife 20.46 19.92 21.01 
Both 78.38 78.64 78.11 
Loans     
Husband 5.12 5.17 5.07 
Wife 4.46 4.40 4.52 
Both 90.42 90.44 90.41 
Savings     
Husband 4.23 4.63 3.84 
Wife 6.65 6.38 6.92 
Both 89.12 88.99 89.24 
 
 































































Table 2. Multinomial Probit Regression (Joint decision compared to mainly the husband): Marginal Effects 
Explanatory variables 




















Husband education (Ref. Primary educ. or less)    
Lower Secondary Education 0.011 0.006 0.004 -0.002 0.004 
 
(0.941) (0.712) (0.220) (-0.316) (0.512) 
Upper Secondary Education 0.048*** 0.020* 0.029 0.002 0.010 
 
(3.733) (2.214) (1.672) (0.298) (1.349) 
Tertiary Education  0.068*** 0.025** 0.066*** -0.011 0.015 
(5.145) (2.724) (3.837) (-1.383) (1.920) 
Wife education (Ref. Primary educ. or less)    
Lower Secondary Education -0.008 -0.012 0.010 0.009 -0.003 
 
(-0.669) (-1.309) (0.530) (1.443) (-0.395) 
Upper Secondary Education 0.002 -0.001 0.047** 0.015* 0.012 
 
(0.134) (-0.144) (2.618) (2.074) (1.473) 
Tertiary Education  0.029* 0.026* 0.042* 0.024** 0.003 
(2.019) (2.468) (2.151) (3.148) (0.343) 
Wage (monthly)      
Husband's wage 1.7e-5*** 1.6e-5*** 2.2e-5*** 1.6e-5*** 1.2e-5*** 
 (3.496) (3.746) (3.477) (4.914) (3.582) 
Wife's wage 5.8e-5*** 0.2e-6 -0.2e-6 -1.3e-5 -0.01e-6 
 (8.128) (0.394) (-0.250) (-2.687) (-0.347) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log pseudo likelihood -14004.2 -9125.1 -3725.6 -6224.5 -7017.9 
χ2 1960.13 807.75 253.73 425.17 454.83 
Degrees of freedom 72 72 72 72 72 
Probability > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 18,387 18,118 6,807 16,914 17,432 































































Note: Control variables included are the following: Husband labor market (employed, or not) wife labor market, birth cohort husband and wife, country of 
birth of husband and wife, children under 16 years (except in the regression related to significant expenditure on children), population density, and region. t- 
statistics in parentheses.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001 































































Table 3. Multinomial Probit Regression (Mainly the wife compared to mainly the husband): Marginal Effects 
Explanatory variables 




















Husband education (Ref. Primary educ. or less)    
Lower Secondary Education -0.009 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 
 
(-0.768) (-0.632) (-0.305) (-0.616) (-0.111) 
Upper Secondary Education -0.050*** -0.018* -0.030 -0.013** -0.013* 
 
(-3.811) (-2.130) (-1.744) (-2.981) (-2.472) 
Tertiary Education  -0.066*** -0.024** -0.064*** -0.021*** -0.029*** 
(-4.914) (-2.860) (-3.760) (-5.017) (-5.502) 
Wife education (Ref. Primary educ. or less)    
Lower Secondary Education 0.023 0.017* -0.008 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(1.872) (1.964) (-0.468) (-0.529) (-0.446) 
Upper Secondary Education 0.014 0.006 -0.044* -0.001 -0.010 
 
(1.064) (0.691) (-2.501) (-0.221) (-1.674) 
Tertiary Education  -0.025 -0.016 -0.036 -0.006 -0.003 
(-1.697) (-1.615) (-1.859) (-1.050) 
(-0.421) 
 
Wage (monthly)      
Husband's wage -1.3e-5* -1.5e-5*** -2.1e-5*** -0.7e-6*** -0.9e-6*** 
 (-2.474) (-3.728) (-3.455) (-3.325) (-3.729) 
Wife's wage -7.2e-5*** -0.6e-6 -0.1e-6 0.4e-6 -0.1e-6 
 (-9.603) (-1.142) (-0.158) (1.375) (-1.208) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log pseudo likelihood -14004.2 -9125.1 -3725.6 -6224.5 -7017.9 
χ2 1960.13 807.75 253.73 425.17 454.83 
Degrees of freedom 72 72 72 72 72 
Probability > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 































































N 18,387 18,118 6,807 16,914 17,432 
Note: Control variables included are the following: Husband labor market (employed, or not) wife labor market, birth cohort husband and wife, country of 
birth husband and wife, children under 16 years (except in the regression related to significant expenditure on children), population density, and region. t- 
statistics in parentheses.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001 






















































































Primary education or less 34.14 33.55 16.60 32.35 33.43 
Lower secondary education 23.83 24.00 29.21 24.44 23.85 
Upper secondary education 18.03 18.17 23.28 18.44 18.13 
Tertiary education  24.00 24.29 30.91 24.77 24.59 
Wife education 
Primary education or less 35.03 34.58 13.35 33.16 34.52 
Lower secondary education 23.75 23.78 27.40 24.13 23.70 
Upper secondary educati n 17.18 17.30 22.76 17.80 17.22 
Tertiary education  24.04 24.33 36.49 24.91 24.55 
Husband labor market 
Not employed 43.41 42.84 18.55 40.70 42.93 
Employed 56.59 57.16 81.45 59.30 57.07 
Wife labor market 
Not employed 57.96 57.54 41.15 56.13 57.58 
Employed 42.04 42.46 58.85 43.87 42.42 
Wage (monthly in euros) 
Husband's wage (mean) 774.55 783.51 1,106.24 812.80 786.67 
Husband's wage (Std. Dev.) 1,032.33 1,036.17 1,056.15 1,041.70 1,041.10 
Wife's wage (mean) 484.34 489.90 699.76 507.28 491.76 
Wife's wage (Std. Dev.) 785.21 788.82 871.00 796.89 790.75 
Birth cohort husband  
1959 or before 56.31 56.10 15.19 54.45 56.41 
1960 to 1969 23.40 23.63 46.89 24.55 23.62 
1970 or after 20.29 20.27 37.92 21.00 19.96 
Birth cohort wife 
1959 or before 49.74 49.45 7.29 47.67 49.81 
1960 to 1969 24.26 24.52 41.40 25.40 24.52 
1970 or after 26.00 26.03 51.31 26.93 25.67 
Country of birth of the husband 
Born in Spain  92.38 92.52 87.69 92.50 92.81 
Not born in Spain  7.62 7.48 12.31 7.50 7.19 
Country of birth of the wife 
Born in Spain  91.08 91.24 85.94 91.26 91.69 
Not born in Spain  8.92 8.76 14.06 8.74 8.31 
Children 
Children under 16 years old 62.98 62.64 100.00 61.28 62.95 
Not children under 16 years old 37.02 37.36 0.00 38.72 37.05 
Population density 
High density  46.31 46.44 45.50 46.65 46.58 
Middle density 21.41 21.38 23.55 21.43 21.06 

































































Low density 32.28 32.18 30.95 31.93 32.36 
      













Andalusia 11.77 11.81 13.49  12.16 12.01 
Aragon 4.40  4.43 4.22  4.52 4.42 
Asturias 4.56  4.56  3.36 4.49 4.48 
Balearic Islands 3.19  3.18  3.33  3.36 3.20 
Basque Country 5.09  5.14 5.10  5.33 5.18 
Canary Islands 4.16   4.18  4.95 4.25 4.15 
Cantabria 3.15 3.17  2.92  3.04 3.06 
Castile and Leon 6.71  6.72 5.79 6.78 6.84 
Castile-La Mancha 5.43  5.38  6.11 5.17 5.42 
Catalonia 10.72  10.70  10.74 10.83  10.90 
Extremadura 4.08 4.11 3.67 4.16  4.22 
Galicia 7.95  7.87 6.04 7.69 7.93  
Madrid (Region of) 8.84 8.84 8.86 8.76 8.83 
Murcia 3.98 3.97 4.75 3.96 3.69 
Navarre 3.38  3.39 3.64 3.34 3.22 
Rioja (La) 3.35  3.31 2.91   3.23 3.41 
Valencian Community 7.46 7.50 7.58  7.19  7.25 
Autonomous cities (Ceuta-Melilla) 1.78  1.74 2.54 1.75 1.80 
N 18,387 18,118 6,807 16,914 17,432 
 Note: Figures are in percentages, except wages, which are in euros. 
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